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SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES-LABILITY ON BOND FOR MALFEASANCE OF A DEPuTY.-P's decedent was engaged unlawfully in a
game of chance, commonly known as "poker."
D and his deputy
attempted to arrest him without a warrant and when the deceased
resisted, the deputy shot him. P sued D and his surety on D's
official bond for the unlawful killing. Held, Action for such
wrongful death cannot be maintained on the sheriff's bond, because
under the statute, the sheriff's bond is breached only by a misfeasance of the deputy. This killing was without authority and was
therefore a malfeasance. State ex rel. Sonner v. Dean et al, 126
S. E. 411 (W. Va. 1925).
The ground of the decision is based upon Chapter 7, § 11 of the
W. Va. Code (1923) which provides: "any default of misfeasance
in office of such deputy, shall be deemed a breach of the conditions
of the official bond of his principal." The act of the deputy in
shooting, being positively unlawful and wrongful, without a warrant, and there being no threatened breach of the peace, was a
malfeasance, and thus not within the wording of the statute. No
case on all fours has been found, nor were any precedents in point
cited by the court. In Coite v. Lynes, 33 Conn. 109 (1865) it was
held that the sheriff was not liable for the active malfeasance, as
distinguished from mere nonfeasance, of his deputy. The court
admitted that the decision was against the generally accepted
view, and explained it on the ground that by statute, the deputy
is substantially an independent officer. In Towle v. Mathews, 130
Cal. 574, 62 Pac. 1064 (1900) it was held that where the plaintiff,
while resisting arrest by a constable and his deputy, was shot by
the deputy willfully, but not maliciously, the constable and his
bondsmen were liable. But in this case the arrest was for a
breach of the peace and in thus distinguishable from the principal
one. A distinction applicable in such cases is laid down in MzcHsm
ON PUBuC OFFICERS, p 177 as follows: "Acts done virtute officii
are where they are within the authority of the officer, but in doing
them he exercises that authority improperly, or abuses the confidence which the law reposes in him; whilst acts done colore offi'c0ii
are where they are of such a nature that his office gives him no
authority to do them.' " Of course there is a third class of acts
which might be termend extra offkium, where they are of such a
nature as to be wholly malicious and wanton, and for these the
sheriff and his sureties are not liable. M.CaEM, PUBuC OFFICERS,
p 534-5. But quaere, according to the above definition, was not
the malfeasance of the deputy in the principal case an act colore
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officii? In Lucas v. Locke, 11 W.Va. 81(1877), the court said, "On
common law principles governing the ordinary relation of principal and agent, the sheriff would not be responsible for an act
done by his deputy colore officii; but on principles of public policy
applying to the relation of a sheriff and his deputy, the former is
liable in such case; on the same principle it would seem that he
and his sureties are liable on his official bond." It is submitted
that this case ought to have been followed unless Chapter 7, § 11
was intended to limit strictly the liability to acts done virtute
officii, and not colore officii, and to set out the only instances which
would constitute a breach of the condition of the bond. If such
was the intent of the legislature, would it not have been stated
that a technical misfeasance and a misfeasance only would amount
to a breach of the condition? There is nothing to show that the
word was not given its ordinary meaning, familiar to the layman, as
"a wrong done," WEBSsTE's NEW INTRNATioNAL DICTIONARY, and
as merely synonymous with "default." Also why was it not ineluded in Chapter 10, § 6 of the Code entitled "Condition of
Bond-Extent of Liability" instead of as an obscure part of Chapter 7? No mention is made in the decision of Chapter 10 supra,
providing "when a person undertaking any office is required by
law to give an official bond, the condition, unless otherwise provided, shall be for a faithful discharge by him of the duties of
his office." A sheriff is responsible for the defaults or misconduct
of his deputy in office, 35 CYc. 1906, Knowlton v. Bartlett, 1 Pick.
273; Arnold v. Hawkins, 79 W. Va. 205, 90 S. E. 678 (1916). It
is submitted that the malfeasance of the deputy was thus a breach
of the condition "for a faithful discharge by him of the duties of
his office," and that Chapter 7, § 11 supra, was not intended to
abrogate the rule of liability laid down in Lucas v. Locke supra,
but was intended to be merely declaratory of certain acts, and not
those acts exclusively, which would amount to a breach of the
condition of the sheriff's bond. That such acts of a deputy done
colore officii are a breach of the condition, rendering the sheriff
liable, by the great weight of authority, see MECHEm ON PUBLIC
OFFICERs, p. 534. It is a singular fact that neither Lucas v. Locke
supra, nor chapter 10 were referred to in the opinion in the
principal case. It would seem that a liability should have been
imposed for two reasons, (1) There was a precedent in point which,
if distinguishable, requires differentiation; (2) reasons of public
policy require the protection of society from the wholly unauthorized acts of public officers. These reasons seem to outweigh the
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interest of the sheriff and his bondsmen in not being held pecuniarly liable on a contract, the probable consequence of which they
might well have forseen. It is believed then, that upon both principle and authority, the result reached in the principal case was
undesirable, and that a contrary conclusion could well have been
reached had the attention of the court been called to Lucas v. Locke,
and to Chapter 10 § 6 of the Code.
-R. T. D.

INTOXICATING

LIQUORS--INDICTMENT FOR UNLAWFUL TRANSPOR-

TATION-FAILING TO NEGATIVE THE EXCEPTIONS IN THE STATUTE.The defendant was indicted under Chapter 32A, § 31a, Barnes'
West Virginia Code, 1923, which reads as follows: "It shall be
unlawful for any person to order, purchase, sell, or cause intoxicating liquors to be transported into the state, or from one place
to another within the state, in any manner, except pure grain
alcohol, for medicinal, pharmaceutical, scientific, and mechanical
purposes, and wine for sacramental purposes to be used by religious
bodies, as now provided by law."
The indictment against the defendant alleged, ....
"that the
defendant had unlawfully transported grain alcohol into the state,
against the peace and dignity of the state." In the lower court
the defendant made a motion to quash the indictment on the
ground that it failed to negative the exceptions in the statute
above. This motion was overruled, the defendant convicted, and
an appeal taken. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that the indictment should have been quashed for failing to
negative the exceptions in the statute; and as the defendant was
not indicted within one year, he was discharged. State v. Taylor,
95 W. Va. 518, 121 S. E. 573.
It is the desire of the writer to discuss this case on the point
which holds that a failure to negative the exceptions in the statute
furnishes sufficient grounds to quash an indictment. The purpose
of this article is to show, first, that this decision fails to carry out
one of the primary purposes for which the law was established;
seco)id, that the decision is decidedly against the weight of authority in this country; and, third, that it is not strictly in accord with
our West Virginia decisions.
The writer feels that no authority is necessary to support him
in saying that, "One of the essential purposes of the law is to
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